Elgar Companion to Public Economics

Contents:

Preface
Introduction and Background
Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula

Part I: The Public Economy
1. Public Finance and the Three Branch Model
Richard A. Musgrave

2. The Empirics of the Three Branch Model
Attiat F. Ott

3. Wagner's Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities
Alan Peacock

4. Wagner's Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach
James E. Payne, Bradley T. Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi

5. Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why?
Attiat F. Ott and Nirupama Devaraj

6. Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey
Robert T. Deacon and Sarani Saha

7. Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa
Rita Babihuga

Part II: Public Sector Provision
8. The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey
Thomas Borcherding and Dong (Dan) Lee

9. Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public Goods
Soma Ghosh

10. Economics of Conflict
Keith Hartley

11. Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data
Rati Ram

12. The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and Turkey
Julide Yildirim, Selami Sezgin and Nadir OEcal

Part III: Re-Shaping Public Sector Outcomes in a Democracy
13. Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes
Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgaessner

14. Direct Democracy and Tiebout Exit
Nirupama Devaraj

15. An Extension of the Rational Voter Model
Richard J. Cebula and Gordon Tullock

16. A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating
Richard J. Cebula

17. Line Item Veto: Lessons from the Literature
David Schap

18. An Analysis of the UN Security Council Veto
Nevila Kote

Part IV: Models of Public Sector Behavior
19. The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation
Vladislav Dolgopolov, Bonnie Orcutt and Attiat F. Ott

20. The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models
Trufat Woldesenbet

21. What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith
Vjacheslav Dombrovsky

22. Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones

References
Index

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