Elgar Companion to Public Economics

Contents: Preface Introduction and Background Attiat F. Ott and Richard J. Cebula Part I: The Public Economy 1. Public Finance and the Three Branch Model Richard A. Musgrave 2. The Empirics of the Three Branch Model Attiat F. Ott 3. Wagner's Law of Increasing Expansion of Public Activities Alan Peacock 4. Wagner's Hypothesis: New Evidence from the US Using the Bounds Testing Approach James E. Payne, Bradley T. Ewing and Hassan Mohammadi 5. Soft Budget Constraint and Hard Budget Constraint: Who is Bailing Out Whom and Why? Attiat F. Ott and Nirupama Devaraj 6. Public Good Provision by Dictatorship: A Survey Robert T. Deacon and Sarani Saha 7. Empirical Evidence on the Optimality and Productivity of Government Services in Sub-Saharan Africa Rita Babihuga Part II: Public Sector Provision 8. The Supply Side of Democratic Government: A Brief Survey Thomas Borcherding and Dong (Dan) Lee 9. Strategic Interaction Among Local Governments: A Spatial Analysis of Spillover of Public Goods Soma Ghosh 10. Economics of Conflict Keith Hartley 11. Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth: Evidence from Cross-Country Panel Data Rati Ram 12. The Demand for Military Spending in Middle Eastern Countries and Turkey Julide Yildirim, Selami Sezgin and Nadir OEcal Part III: Re-Shaping Public Sector Outcomes in a Democracy 13. Fiscal Policy and Direct Democracy: Institutional Design Determines Outcomes Lars P. Feld and Gebhard Kirchgassner 14. Direct Democracy and Tiebout Exit Nirupama Devaraj 15. An Extension of the Rational Voter Model Richard J. Cebula and Gordon Tullock 16. A Preliminary Analysis of the Presidential Approval Rating Richard J. Cebula 17. Line Item Veto: Lessons from the Literature David Schap 18. An Analysis of the UN Security Council Veto Nevila Kote Part IV: Models of Public Sector Behavior 19. The Political Theories of Deficits and Debt Accumulation Vladislav Dolgopolov, Bonnie Orcutt and Attiat F. Ott 20. The Efficiency of Representative Democracy: A Comparative Study of Two Competing Models Trufat Woldesenbet 21. What Kept the Russian Federation Intact? Testing the Internal Exit Model of Buchanan and Faith Vjacheslav Dombrovsky 22. Secession and Exit: An Analysis of Two Competing Hypotheses Constantine Alexandrakis and Robert T. Jones References Index

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