Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law
Post-Chicago Developments in Antitrust Law
Cucinotta, Antonio; Pardolesi, Roberto; Van den Bergh, Roger J.
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
12/2002
352
Dura
Inglês
9781843760016
15 a 20 dias
Descrição não disponível.
Contents:
1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust
Herbert Hovenkamp
2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law
Roger Van den Bergh
3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust
Jonathan B. Baker
4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization
Eleanor M. Fox
5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust
Patrick Van Cayseele
6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy
Rudolph J.R. Peritz
7. 'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts
John E. Lopatka and William H. Page
8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer Power
Michael S. Jacobs
9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of Collusion
Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel
10. Raising Consumers' Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings)
Francesco Denozza
11. How Safe is the King's Throne? Network Externalities on Trial
Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda
12. The Vertical Price Fixing Controversy
Antonio Cucinotta
13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280
Peter C. Carstensen
14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive Stages
Robert L. Steiner
Index
1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust
Herbert Hovenkamp
2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law
Roger Van den Bergh
3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust
Jonathan B. Baker
4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization
Eleanor M. Fox
5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust
Patrick Van Cayseele
6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy
Rudolph J.R. Peritz
7. 'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts
John E. Lopatka and William H. Page
8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer Power
Michael S. Jacobs
9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of Collusion
Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel
10. Raising Consumers' Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings)
Francesco Denozza
11. How Safe is the King's Throne? Network Externalities on Trial
Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda
12. The Vertical Price Fixing Controversy
Antonio Cucinotta
13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280
Peter C. Carstensen
14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive Stages
Robert L. Steiner
Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Contents:
1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust
Herbert Hovenkamp
2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law
Roger Van den Bergh
3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust
Jonathan B. Baker
4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization
Eleanor M. Fox
5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust
Patrick Van Cayseele
6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy
Rudolph J.R. Peritz
7. 'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts
John E. Lopatka and William H. Page
8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer Power
Michael S. Jacobs
9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of Collusion
Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel
10. Raising Consumers' Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings)
Francesco Denozza
11. How Safe is the King's Throne? Network Externalities on Trial
Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda
12. The Vertical Price Fixing Controversy
Antonio Cucinotta
13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280
Peter C. Carstensen
14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive Stages
Robert L. Steiner
Index
1. The Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust
Herbert Hovenkamp
2. The Difficult Reception of Economic Analysis in European Competition Law
Roger Van den Bergh
3. Apreface to Post-Chicago Antitrust
Jonathan B. Baker
4. Post-Chicago, Post-Seattle and the Dilemma of Globalization
Eleanor M. Fox
5. The Bounds Approach to Antitrust
Patrick Van Cayseele
6. Dynamic Efficiency and US Antitrust Policy
Rudolph J.R. Peritz
7. 'Obvious' Consumer Harm in Antitrust Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School and the Courts
John E. Lopatka and William H. Page
8. Second Order Oligopoly Problems with International Dimensions: Sequential Mergers, Maverick Firms and Buyer Power
Michael S. Jacobs
9. Rule Fixing: An Overlooked but General Category of Collusion
Robert H. Lande and Howard P. Marvel
10. Raising Consumers' Costs as an Antitrust Problem: A Sketch of the Argument from Kodak to Microsoft (the European Proceedings)
Francesco Denozza
11. How Safe is the King's Throne? Network Externalities on Trial
Roberto Pardolesi and Andrea Renda
12. The Vertical Price Fixing Controversy
Antonio Cucinotta
13. The Competitive Dynamics of Distribution Restraints: Efficiency versus Rent Seeking 280
Peter C. Carstensen
14. Cooperation, Competition and Collusion Among Firms at Successive Stages
Robert L. Steiner
Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.