Antitrust and Competition Policy
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Antitrust and Competition Policy
Kleit, Andrew N.
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
04/2005
672
Dura
Inglês
9781843763192
15 a 20 dias
Descrição não disponível.
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Andrew N. Kleit
PART I MONOPOLIZATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1974), 'Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly'
2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits'
PART II MERGERS
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs'
4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), 'The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits'
5. Robert D. Willig (1991), 'Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines'
6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), 'Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?'
7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), 'Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm'
8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), 'The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy'
PART III COLLUSION
9. George J. Stigler (1964), 'A Theory of Oligopoly'
10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), 'An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies'
11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), 'Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion'
PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
12. Lester G. Telser (1960), 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?'
13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), 'Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms'
PART V PREDATORY PRICING
14. John S. McGee (1958), 'Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case'
15. Robert H. Bork (1978), 'Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories'
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), 'Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence'
PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), 'Cost-Raising Strategies'
18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), 'Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs"'
19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure'
20. David Reiffen (1992), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment'
21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry'
22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), 'Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit'
PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), 'Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility'
24. Paul A. David (1985), 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY'
25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), 'The Fable of the Keys'
PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY
26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition'
27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), 'Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?'
28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), 'Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges'
29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), 'Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges'
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Andrew N. Kleit
PART I MONOPOLIZATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1974), 'Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly'
2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits'
PART II MERGERS
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs'
4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), 'The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits'
5. Robert D. Willig (1991), 'Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines'
6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), 'Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?'
7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), 'Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm'
8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), 'The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy'
PART III COLLUSION
9. George J. Stigler (1964), 'A Theory of Oligopoly'
10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), 'An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies'
11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), 'Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion'
PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
12. Lester G. Telser (1960), 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?'
13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), 'Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms'
PART V PREDATORY PRICING
14. John S. McGee (1958), 'Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case'
15. Robert H. Bork (1978), 'Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories'
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), 'Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence'
PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), 'Cost-Raising Strategies'
18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), 'Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs"'
19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure'
20. David Reiffen (1992), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment'
21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry'
22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), 'Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit'
PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), 'Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility'
24. Paul A. David (1985), 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY'
25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), 'The Fable of the Keys'
PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY
26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition'
27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), 'Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?'
28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), 'Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges'
29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), 'Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges'
Name Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Contents:
Acknowledgements
Introduction Andrew N. Kleit
PART I MONOPOLIZATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1974), 'Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly'
2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits'
PART II MERGERS
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs'
4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), 'The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits'
5. Robert D. Willig (1991), 'Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines'
6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), 'Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?'
7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), 'Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm'
8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), 'The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy'
PART III COLLUSION
9. George J. Stigler (1964), 'A Theory of Oligopoly'
10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), 'An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies'
11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), 'Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion'
PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
12. Lester G. Telser (1960), 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?'
13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), 'Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms'
PART V PREDATORY PRICING
14. John S. McGee (1958), 'Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case'
15. Robert H. Bork (1978), 'Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories'
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), 'Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence'
PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), 'Cost-Raising Strategies'
18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), 'Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs"'
19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure'
20. David Reiffen (1992), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment'
21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry'
22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), 'Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit'
PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), 'Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility'
24. Paul A. David (1985), 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY'
25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), 'The Fable of the Keys'
PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY
26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition'
27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), 'Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?'
28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), 'Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges'
29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), 'Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges'
Name Index
Acknowledgements
Introduction Andrew N. Kleit
PART I MONOPOLIZATION
1. Harold Demsetz (1974), 'Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly'
2. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), 'On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits'
PART II MERGERS
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), 'Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs'
4. Kenneth G. Elzinga and Thomas F. Hogarty (1973), 'The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits'
5. Robert D. Willig (1991), 'Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines'
6. Barry C. Harris and Joseph J. Simons (1989), 'Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution is Necessary?'
7. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1988), 'Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm'
8. Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb (1994), 'The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy'
PART III COLLUSION
9. George J. Stigler (1964), 'A Theory of Oligopoly'
10. George A. Hay and Daniel Kelley (1974), 'An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies'
11. Thomas E. Cooper (1986), 'Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion'
PART IV VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
12. Lester G. Telser (1960), 'Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?'
13. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), 'Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms'
PART V PREDATORY PRICING
14. John S. McGee (1958), 'Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case'
15. Robert H. Bork (1978), 'Injury to Competition: The Law's Basic Theories'
16. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), 'Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence'
PART VI EXCLUSIONARY BEHAVIOR
17. Steven C. Salop and David T. Scheffman (1987), 'Cost-Raising Strategies'
18. Timothy J. Brennan (1988), 'Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs"'
19. Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Saloner and Steven C. Salop (1990), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure'
20. David Reiffen (1992), 'Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure: Comment'
21. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), 'Contracts as a Barrier to Entry'
22. David A. Butz and Andrew N. Kleit (2001), 'Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive? Lessons from Interstate Circuit'
PART VII NETWORK EXTERNALITIES
23. Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro (1985), 'Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility'
24. Paul A. David (1985), 'Clio and the Economics of QWERTY'
25. S.J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis (1990), 'The Fable of the Keys'
PART VIII ANTITRUST, REGULATION, AND BUREAUCRACY
26. William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover (1985), 'Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition'
27. Timothy J. Brennan (1995), 'Is the Theory Behind U.S. v. AT&T Applicable Today?'
28. Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins and Fred S. McChesney (1990), 'Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges'
29. Malcolm B. Coate, Andrew N. Kleit and Rene Bustamante (1995), 'Fight, Fold or Settle?: Modelling the Reaction to FTC Merger Challenges'
Name Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
